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Abstract
In non-network settings, encouragement designs have been widely used to ana-
lyze causal effects of a treatment, policy, or intervention on an outcome of interest
when randomizing the treatment was considered impractical or when compliance to
treatment cannot be perfectly enforced. Unfortunately, such questions related to
treatment compliance have received less attention in network settings and the most
well-studied experimental design in networks, the two-stage randomization design,
requires perfect compliance with treatment. The paper proposes a new experimental
design called peer encouragement design to study network treatment effects when en-
forcing treatment randomization is not feasible. The key idea in peer encouragement
design is the idea of personalized encouragement, which allows point-identification
of familiar estimands in the encouragement design literature. The paper also defines
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new causal estimands, local average network effects, that can be identified under
the new design and analyzes the effect of non-compliance behavior in randomized
experiments on networks.
Keywords: Direct effects, Instrumental variables, Non-compliance, Randomized experi-
ments, Spillover effects
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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation: Treatment Compliance in Network Settings
There is a growing literature on studying causal effects of a treatment, policy, or an interven-
tion on an outcome in network/interference settings (Manski, 1993; Sacerdote, 2001; Sobel,
2006; Rosenbaum, 2007; Hudgens and Halloran, 2008; Tchetgen Tchetgen and VanderWeele,
2012; Aronow and Samii, 2013; Manski, 2013; Ugander et al., 2013; Eckles et al., 2014;
VanderWeele et al., 2014). The vast majority of the work focus on the case where the
treatment can be assigned to all individuals in the network and compliance with treatment
assignment is perfectly enforced. For example, the most well studied design in network set-
tings to study treatment effects, the two-stage randomization design of Hudgens and Halloran
(2008), requires the treatment of interest to be randomized to each individuals in across
network blocks (see Section 2.1 for details) and assumes that the individual perfectly com-
plies with the treatment assignment. However, in practice, especially in the social sciences,
treatment can be expensive, harmful, or unethical and consequently, enforcing treatment
randomization and perfect compliance is infeasible. For example, a recent work by Yi et al.
(2015) studied the impact of financial aid (i.e. treatment) on student performance (i.e. out-
come) among students in rural China. Since the choice to receive and accept financial aid
is confounded by potentially unmeasured factors, say family socioeconomic backgrounds
and student’s self-perception of future earning potential, the treatment is not only dif-
ficult to randomize, but also faces issues of non-compliance. Furthermore, studies have
shown presence of peer effects when evaluating student performance in school settings
(Gaviria and Raphael, 2001; Sacerdote, 2001; Fletcher, 2013) and consequently, interfer-
ence has to be taken into account. Evans et al. (1992), Powell et al. (2005), Lundborg
(2006), Fletcher (2010), and An (2015) discuss other examples of non-compliance or where
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treatment of interest cannot be fully randomized in school settings.
More recently, massive open online courses (MOOCs) like Coursera, edX, and Udacity,
which brings the classroom learning experience to online settings, bring a deluge of data
about student behavior in classrooms (Breslow et al., 2013; Reich, 2015) and have opened
new avenues for studying student behavior among their peers. Some recent studies of
student behavior in MOOCs include examining the peer effect among students in an online
classroom forum and its impact in overall completion of the course (Anderson et al., 2014;
Kizilcec et al., 2014). However, studying the treatment effect of say, forum engagement
(i.e. treatment) in class completion (i.e. outcome), in MOOCs is fraught with issues,
such as enforcing student engagement in forums and compliance (Anderson et al., 2014;
Kizilcec et al., 2014).
1.2 Prior Work
Even though scenarios in Section 1.1 come up frequently, unfortunately, there is a paucity
of work in studying treatment effects when treatment cannot be randomized or fully
enforced in network settings. In non-network literature, a popular class of experimen-
tal designs known as encouragement designs have been used to study treatment efficacy
when treatment couldn’t be randomized. For example, Permutt and Hebel (1989) and
Sexton and Hebel (1984) studied the effect of smoking (i.e. treatment) on birth weight (i.e.
outcome) among pregnant mothers, not by randomizing pregnant mothers to smoke, but by
randomly encouraging the mothers’ physicians to discourage smoking and using this ran-
dom encouragement to induce randomization on the treatment. Sommer and Zeger (1991)
and Angrist et al. (1996) generalized this problem as treatment non-compliance within the
framework of instrumental variables (IV). However, all these previous studies are under
non-network settings.
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Notably, Sobel (2006) explored the effect of non-compliance in network settings and
highlighted many challenges of applying non-compliance ideas from non-network literature
into network settings. In particular, Theorems 5 and 6 of Sobel (2006) showed that the
standard results in non-network settings for non-compliance, such as the Wald estimator
(Wald, 1940) (or the “IV” estimator (Imbens and Angrist, 1994; Herna´n and Robins, 2006;
Baiocchi et al., 2014)) or the two-stage least squares (TSLS) estimator (Wooldridge, 2010),
failed to identify local causal effects of Angrist et al. (1996), let alone causal effects even
when linear modeling assumptions were used. Sobel (2006) went onto show that even the
intent-to-treat (ITT) estimands, popular in non-compliance settings and a key ingredient
of the Wald estimator, may not estimate a causal quantity once interference is present; see
Theorems 2 and 4 of Sobel (2006) for details. While recognizing the challenges, unfortu-
nately, Sobel (2006) did not provide a solution to handle non-compliance in network settings
and hoped “students of causal inference and experimental design will devote attention to
these important issues in future work” Sobel (2006). Later works by Hudgens and Halloran
(2008) and VanderWeele et al. (2014) also did not address the issue of non-compliance in
network experiments.
The key difficulty in resolving non-compliance in networks is the exponential amount of
heterogeneity that’s inherent with non-compliance in networks and this can be illustrated
within the framework of principal stratification (Frangakis and Rubin, 2002). Following
Hudgens and Halloran (2008), suppose we have a randomized experiment where a binary
treatment is randomly assigned to n individuals in a network. Due to interference, each
individual’s treatment that he/she has actually taken may be a function of all the other in-
dividuals’ treatment assignment in the network. Consequently, this creates an exponential
number of principal stratas, up to 4n, that individuals may fall into based on their treat-
ment assignment and received preferences. Without any reasonable restrictions on these
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stratas and how they compare to each other, it would be difficult to identify or even inter-
pret an average treatment effect. One could, in theory, remove the exponential treatment
heterogeneity by assuming every individual’s effect of treatment assignment on treatment
taken is additive, linear, and constant; see Holland (1988) and first-stage models of popular
IV models in econometrics (e.g. Section 5.1 of Wooldridge (2010)). However, as remarked
in Section 2 of Angrist et al. (1996), this oversimplification leads to unnecessarily simple
treatment effects. In fact, the key to making progress in non-compliance in randomized
experiments on networks is (i) placing reasonable restrictions on treatment heterogeneity
and (ii) making sure that these restrictions lead to familiar, identifiable and, perhaps more
importantly, interpretable causal estimands.
1.3 Our Contribution
This paper addresses the scenario where treatment randomization is impractical and non-
compliance may be present in network settings by using a design-based approach. Specif-
ically, we propose a new experimental design, called the peer encouragement design, is a
hybrid of encouragement designs in non-network settings and two-stage randomization of
Hudgens and Halloran (2008). The key, novel components of the design are not so much
the hybridization of the two experimental designs in the literature, but more importantly
(i) the notion of personalized encouragements and (ii) identification of local network causal
effects, both of which play integral roles in resolving the problem of exponential hetero-
geneity discussed in the previous section; in fact, we show that a simple, naive application
of the two previous experimental designs will generally not lead to any reasonable causal
estimands.
In proposing the peer encouragement design, we hope to achieve three goals. The first
is empirical where investigators can use our design to analyze causal effects of a treatment
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whenever treatment randomization is not possible. Second, peer encouragement designs
allow analysis of non-compliance behavior in network experiments. In particular, we ex-
tend the work of Angrist et al. (1996) and Sobel (2006) and show positive results regarding
identification of network effects, all without making modeling assumptions, when non-
compliance is present. Third, much like how encouragement designs and, more broadly, in-
strumental variables, are “quasi-experimental” designs (Holland, 1988) that serve as a mid-
dle ground between randomized experiments and observational studies in non-network set-
tings, we hope that the peer encouragement design serves as a stepping stone for analyzing
observational network data, which is generally fraught with problemsShalizi and Thomas
(2011), although some progress has been made (Hong and Raudenbush, 2006; Tchetgen Tchetgen and VanderW
2012; Sofrygin and van der Laan, 2015; Forastiere, 2016).
2 Peer Encouragement Design
2.1 Notation, Network Structure, and Potential Outcomes
Following Sobel (2006), Rosenbaum (2007), Hudgens and Halloran (2008), Tchetgen Tchetgen and VanderW
(2012), and VanderWeele et al. (2014), we focus on the partial interference setting where
the network can be partitioned into disconnected sub-networks (i.e. blocks), such as schools
in a local district where each school comprise a sub-network or online courses (or schools)
in MOOC settings where each class serves as its own sub-network; see Rosenbaum (2007)
for additional examples of partial interference where network partitioning is done tempo-
rally or spatially. Beyond partial interference, we do not assume any structure about the
network nor do we assume perfect knowledge of the sub-networks. In other words, simi-
lar to Hudgens and Halloran (2008) and Tchetgen Tchetgen and VanderWeele (2012), the
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results in our paper are agnostic to knowing the exact graph, which can be cumbersome
to identify in practice (Chandrasekhar and Lewis, 2011; Beaman et al., 2015; Kim et al.,
2015)
Under partial interference, we assume N individuals across B sub-networks/blocks in a
finite population. Let n1, ..., nB be the number of individuals in each of the B blocks so that
N =
∑B
j=1 nk. Let Zij denote the randomized assignment (or encouragement assignment)
for jth individual in block i. For each block i, let Zi = (Zi1, . . . , Zini) be the vector of
encouragement assignments to each of the ni individuals in block i and let Zi(j) denote the
ni − 1 subvector of Zi with the jth entry removed. Let Dij be the treatment received for
individual j in block i, Di = (Di1, . . . , Dini) be the vector of treatment received for each of
the ni individual j in block i, and Di(j) be the ni − 1 subvector of Di with the jth entry
removed. Let Yij denote the outcome from individual j in block i and the vector equivalent
Yi = (Yi1, . . . , Yini). We assume the encouragement Zij and the treatment Dij are both
binary where Zij = 1 implies that individual j in block i is encouraged to a treatment value
Dij = 1 and Zij = 0 implies that individual j is encouraged to a treatment value Dij = 0.
Let the lower cases of Zij and Dij , denoted as zij and dij respectively, as realizations of Zij
and Dij .
Following the potential outcomes notation for causal inference in Neyman (1923) and
Rubin (1974), let Dij(zi) denote the potential treatment of individual j in block i if en-
couragements were assigned as zi = (z11, . . . , z1ni) and Di(zi) = (Di1(zi), . . . , Dini(zi)) be
the collection of Dijs in block i. Similarly, let Yij(di, zi) denote the potential outcome of
individual j in block i if encouragements were zi and treatments were di. Let F contain all
the potential outcomes of everyone, i.e. F = {(Yij(di, zi), Dij(zi))|zi ∈ Zni,di ∈ Zni , i =
1, . . . , B, j = 1, . . . , ni}; the set Zni = {(zi1, . . . , zini)|zij ∈ {0, 1}} denotes all values of an
ni dimensional binary vector so that zi ∈ Zni. Let φ and ψ denote two different proba-
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bility measures (or mechanisms) on the set Zni, i.e. Pφ(Zi = zi) and Pψ(Zi = zi). For
example, φ can represent a fair coin flip where each individual in block i flips the fair coin
independently of other individuals in the block and is assigned encouragement, Zij = 1, or
no encouragement, Zij = 0, each with 50% probability. This mechanism can be expressed
as Pφ(Zi = zi) =
∏ni
j=1(1/2)
zij(1/2)1−zij = (1/2)ni. Finally, we also denote I(·) to be the
indicator function.
2.2 Average Potential Outcomes
From the notation, we define average potential outcomes as follows. Given a probability
measure φ (or ψ), we define the individual average potential outcome for individual j in
block i as the average of her potential outcomes when she is assigned the encouragement
value Zij = z, i.e.
Y ij(Dij(z), z, φ) =
∑
zij=z,zi(j)∈Zni−1
Yij(Di(zi), zi)Pφ(Zi(j) = zi(j)) (1)
As an example, if z = 1 in equation (1), Y ij(Dij(1), 1, φ) is the average of individual
j’s potential outcomes if she were encouraged (z = 1) and other individuals in her block
were assigned encouragement values zi(j) where zi(j) follows the marginal distribution of
Zi(j) specified by φ. Conversely, if z = 0, Y ij(Dij(0), 0, φ) is the average of individual
j’s potential outcomes if she were not encouraged (z = 0) and other individuals in her
block were assigned encouragement values zi(j) under the measure φ. We also define block
average potential outcomes Y i(Di(z), z, φ) =
∑ni
j=1 Y ij(Dij(z), z, φ)/ni, and population
average potential outcomes Y (D(z), z, φ) =
∑n
i=1 Y i(Di(z), z, φ)/B.
We can interpret Y ij(Dij(z), z, φ) as an extension of the individual intent-to-treat po-
tential outcome in the instrumental variables literature without interference. Specifically,
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without interference, Y ij(Di(zi, φ), zi) = Yij(Dij(z), z, φ) = Yij(Dij(z), z) so that the in-
dividual average potential outcome Y ij(Dij(z), z, φ) is free from its dependence on φ and
equals the intent-to-treat potential outcome Yij(Dij(z), z). The supplementary materials
also discuss some aspects about the average potential outcome in equation (1), including
some subtle differences between marginal averaging versus conditional averaging of the po-
tential outcomes. To simplify the discussion, we eliminate the distinction between marginal
and conditional averaging by assuming an independent Bernouilli-type mechanism in the
experimental design (see equation (2) in Section 2.3).
2.3 Protocol for Peer Encouragement Design
Given N individuals in the network across B blocks, we propose a new experimental design,
called the peer encouragement design, to study causal effects of a treatment in network
settings where treatment receipt cannot be completely enforced.
1. Let φ and ψ denote two different Bernouilli (i.e. “coin-toss”) mechanisms correspond-
ing to different probabilities on Zni . Specifically, for all zi ∈ Zni , each mechanism
obeys
Pφ(Zi = zi|F) = Pφ(Zi = zi) =
ni∏
j=1
Pφ(Zij = zij), 0 < Pφ(Zij = 1) < 1 (2)
We assume Pφ(Zij = zij) 6= Pψ(Zij = zij).
2. Randomly assign K out of B blocks to mechanism φ while the B − K blocks are
assigned to mechanism ψ.
3. For each block, assign each individual to encouragement Zij = 1 based on the mecha-
nism that the block was assigned to. Encouragements must be personalized whereby
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for all individuals and any zij,
Dij(zi) = Dij(z
′
i) = Dij(zij), ∀zi(j), z
′
i(j) ∈ Zni−1 (3)
and have an effect, i.e.
1
ni
ni∑
j=1
Dij(1)−Dij(0) 6= 0 (4)
As discussed in Section 1, the peer encouragement design has elements of both a traditional
encouragement design in non-network settings and the two-stage randomization design of
Hudgens and Halloran (2008) in partial interference settings. The new design randomizes
the encouragement to treatment, similar to an encouragement design, and the new as-
sign randomizes different mechanisms of encouragement in a two-stage fashion, similar to
Hudgens and Halloran (2008), across different blocks in a network. The two mechanisms
for encouragement in step 1 of the design protocol can be thought of as encouragement
intensities. For example, encouragement mechanism φ corresponds to 20% chance of en-
couragement while ψ corresponds to 80% chance of encouragement and each block in the
network randomly receives different intensities of encouragement in step 2 of the design
protocol; see also Cre´pon et al. (2013) for related discussion in labor economics where
treatment intensities were varied in a two-stage randomization design scheme. Also, the
supplementary material has additional details about the Bernouilli mechanisms φ and ψ in
network settings versus, say, mixed assignment strategies of Hudgens and Halloran (2008).
We note that the peer encouragement design, specifically equation (2), automatically sat-
isfies ignorability of the randomization mechanism to potential outcomes as well as overlap
common in causal inference (Imbens and Rubin, 2015; Herna´n and Robins, 2016). In addi-
tion, akin to the literature on encouragement designs, the encouragement should be chosen
to have a non-negative treatment effect as specified in equation (4) (Angrist et al., 1996).
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However, the peer encouragement design deviates from the two strands of literature, the
encouragement design literature and the network experiment literature, in some important
ways. First, our design requires that the encouragement must be personalized to a specific
individual, as specified in equation (3), and to the best of our knowledge, this is the first
time such an assumption has been presented in both strands of the literature. Personal-
izing encouragement essentially amounts to having no interference at the encouragement
level so that one’s uptake of the treatment through encouragement is only affected by what
encouragement one was assigned to; in other words, the encouragement must be private in
nature. We believe the personalized encouragement assumption serves as a balance between
the technical necessity to identify familiar and interpretable casual estimands and a plausi-
ble assumption to achieve in practice. In particular, technically speaking, this assumption
is key to (i) reduce treatment heterogeneity that’s present in partial interference with non-
compliance and (ii) to present a set of familiar and interpretable causal estimands, such as
complier average causal effects (see Section 4.3 for details). However, the assumption is not
completely restrictively in the sense we do not make any parametric modeling assumptions
between the encouragement and the treatment, which is commonly done in econometrics
to analyze network data; see An (2015) for a recent example. Also, the assumption still
allows for interference between the treatment and the outcome.
Also, the personalized encouragement assumption is plausible in various settings. For
example, consider the online MOOC courses example in Section 1.1 where the goal is to
study student participation in online classroom forums (i.e. treatment) on class comple-
tion (i.e. outcome). Each classroom (or school) can serve as a block in a network and
the encouragement to participate in the online forum can be a prod to participate in the
online forum via badges, algorithmic changes to the student’s online profile, online dis-
play settings, or mobile notifications; see Bond et al. (2012); Anderson et al. (2014) and
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Eckles et al. (2016) for some recent examples where different modes of personalized en-
couragements were used to engage users to use online services in an online randomized
experiment. These encouragements can be designed so that they can only be seen by one
student; no one else in the class has any idea about the encouragement assignment of
other students. As a concrete example, Anderson et al. (2014) conducted a randomized
experiment to study student participation in a classroom forum in a MOOC where each
student’s online profile was tweaked to illicit different levels of encouragement. In some
experimental conditions, other students could not see the encouragement, thereby making
the personalized encouragement assumption very plausible. Indeed, with a growing trend
toward personalized content, we believe the personalized encouragement assumption is very
much plausible in online experiments and it is an interesting direction of future research to
design different levels of personalization for experimental design in order to illicit different
levels of compliance.
Although online setting seems to be the most natural platform to deliver personal-
ized encouragements, personalized encouragements are also plausible in some non-online
settings. For example, revisiting the example in Section 1.1, Yi et al. (2015) studied the
impact of financial aid (i.e. treatment) on student performance (i.e. outcome) among
students in rural China. The authors of the study created a randomized incentive (i.e.
encouragement) in the form of a private discussion with the school principal so that the
students are more like to utilize the financial aid package. Furthermore, the financial aid
package was offered to each student with a non-disclosure notice urging students “not to
discuss [the aid] with anyone beside their guardians and the school principal” (Section 2.2
of Yi et al. (2015)). This minimized others in the network knowing about the financial aid
offer, making the personalized encouragement assumption plausible. Also, another study by
O’Malley et al. (2014) analyzed the network effect of obesity among friends by using a gene
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that has been known to associate with obesity as the “encouragement.” Specifically, in the
spirit of Mendelian randomization where the instruments/encouragements are genetic in
nature (Davey Smith and Ebrahim, 2003, 2004; Lawlor et al., 2008), O’Malley et al. (2014)
utilized the random nature of genetic allele assignment at birth as an encouragement for an
individual to become obese. Since an individual’s genes cannot be influenced by his friends
genes given the individual’s genes, the encouragement is personalized and the personalized
encouragement assumption is very plausible.
However, if the encouragement and the treatment are such that an individual’s exposure
can be a function of his peers receiving or not receiving encouragement, the personalized
encouragement assumption can be violated. For instance, in the financial aid package exam-
ple above, if the students’ discussions wth the school principal about the financial aid were
not private and students were allowed to share details of their financial aid package with
their peers, then the personalized encouragement assumption will not hold. More broadly,
in non-online settings where the personalized encouragement assumption may be suspect,
one can strengthen the plausibility of the assumption by incorporating non-disclosure state-
ments (e.g. financial aid example), creating a short timespan between the offer of a new
treatment, policy or social program and the actual receipt of the treatment/policy/program
so that the discussion about the encouragement amongst peers is minimized, or using pri-
vate forms of encouragements, say via e-mail or mobile notifications. Ultimately, the exact
way to personalize and privatize encouragement is problem-specific and researchers utiliz-
ing our design should carefully plan about not only the nature, but also the delivery of the
encouragement to make the personalized encouragement assumption plausible.
Finally, in addition to the empirical implications of the personalized encouragement
assumption, the personalized encouragement assumption also allows us to study the impact
of non-compliance in randomized experiments on a network with familiar and interpretable
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estimands. Specifically, suppose we treat the encouragement Zij as the treatment assigned
and Dij as the treatment actually received in a randomized experiment. Then, under the
personalized encouragement assumption, the population of individuals under our design
can be partitioned into four different groups, always-takers (i.e. Dij(1) = Dij(0) = 1),
compliers (i.e. Dij(1) = 1, Dij(0) = 0), never-takers (i.e. Dij(1) = Dij(0) = 0), and
defiers (i.e. Dij(1) = 0, Dij(0) = 1), depending on the potential treatment values Dij(z).
These four subgroups are the same subgroups as Angrist et al. (1996) which studied non-
compliance behavior in non-network settings and, as we will see in Sections 3.3 and 4.2,
the personalized encouragement assumption plays a critical role in properly defining and
identifying local average network effects, such as the local direct effect and the local peer
effect.
3 Causal Assumptions
3.1 Network Intent-to-Treat Effects
In non-network settings, it is customary in encouragement designs, or more broadly in in-
strumental variables analysis, to first define and identify intent-to-treat (ITT) effects, which
are causal effects of the encouragement on the outcome. Similarly, in network settings, we
can proceed similarly and define ITT effects in the spirt of Hudgens and Halloran (2008),
Tchetgen Tchetgen and VanderWeele (2012) and VanderWeele et al. (2014). We focus our
attention on the direct intent-to-treat effect, abbreviated as DITT , and the peer intent-to-
treat effect (also known as spillover or indirect effects), abbreviated as PITT . In practice,
especially in the social sciences, the direct and peer effects are often quantities of great inter-
est (Evans et al., 1992; Gaviria and Raphael, 2001; Zimmerman, 2003; Powell et al., 2005;
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Lundborg, 2006) and identification of direct and peer effects usually identify the total and
overall ITT effects; see Hudgens and Halloran (2008), VanderWeele and Tchetgen Tchetgen
(2011) and the supplementary materials for definitions of total and overall ITT effects along
with some well-known effect decompositions.
Formally, for any two values of the encouragement z′, z ∈ {0, 1} where z′ 6= z and two
mechanisms φ and ψ, φ 6= ψ, DITT and PITT are defined as follows.
DITTi(z
′, z, φ) = Y i(Di(z
′), z′, φ)− Y i(Di(z), z, φ)
DITT (z′, z, φ) =
1
B
B∑
i=1
DITTi(z
′, z, φ) = Y (D(z′), z′, φ)− Y (D(z), z, φ)
PITTi(z, φ, ψ) = Y i(Di(z), z, φ)− Y i(Di(z), z, ψ)
PITT (z, φ, ψ) =
1
B
B∑
i=1
PITTi(z, φ, ψ) = Y (D(z), z, φ)− Y (D(z), z, ψ)
If z′ = 1 and z = 0, DITTi(1, 0, φ) is the direct effect of being encouraged versus not being
encouraged on the outcome and PITTi(1, φ, ψ) is the peer effect of being encouraged on
the outcome, all within block i and under measures φ and ψ. Similarly, DITT (1, 0, φ)
and PITT (1, φ, ψ) represent the direct population average ITT effect and peer population
average ITT effect, respectively. One important point to mention about PITT s is that
PITT (0, φ, ψ) and PITT (1, φ, ψ) may not equal to each other. In particular, PITT (0, φ, ψ)
represents the population average peer effect of encouragement on the outcome if individuals
were not encouraged and PITT (1, φ, ψ) represents the population average peer effect of
encouragement on the outcome if individuals were encouraged. It is possible that the
the encouraged individuals may have a stronger peer effect on the outcome compared to
unencouraged individuals, or vice versa, and this distinction will become important in
the presence of non-compliance (see Section 4.3). Also, note that without interference,
DITTi(1, 0, φ) is the ith block average ITT effect of the encouragement, DITT (1, 0, φ)
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would be the usual population average ITT effect and PITTi(z, φ, ψ) = PITT (z, φ, ψ) = 0
for any z = 1 or 0. In short, DITT s and PITT s are generalizations of the usual ITT
effects common in instrumental variables to network settings.
The identification and estimation of network ITT effects like DITT and PITT are
straightforward and directly follows from the results in Hudgens and Halloran (2008). We
briefly re-iterate these results to aid the discussion of identifying local network effects in
Section 4.3. Let Si be a binary variable that denotes which encouragement mechanism
was applied to block i. Without loss of generality, Si = 1 indicates that block i received
encouragement mechanism φ and Si = 0 indicates that block i received mechanism ψ.
We define the following estimators for the block average and population average potential
outcomes defined in Section 2.2 for mechanism φ.
Ŷ i(Di(z), z, φ) =
∑ni
j=1 YijI(Zij = z)
niPφ(Zij = z)
, Ŷ (D(z), z, φ) =
∑B
i=1 Ŷ i(Di(z), z, φ)I(Si = 1)∑B
i=1 I(Si = 1)
Then, without additional assumptions beyond the assumptions which are inherent in the
two-stage randomization design of Hudgens and Halloran (2008) and are also satisfied by
our peer encouragement design, we can identify DITT and PITT
DITT (z′, z, φ) = E
(
Ŷ (D(z′), z′, φ)− Ŷ (D(z), z, φ)
)
, z, z′ ∈ {0, 1}, z 6= z′ (5)
PITT (z, φ, ψ) = E
(
Ŷ (D(z), z, φ)− Ŷ (D(z), z, ψ)
)
, z ∈ {0, 1} (6)
To estimate the direct ITT effect of being encouraged for a mechanism φ (i.e. DITT (1, 0, φ)),
equation (5) states that the contrast between the sample averages Ŷ (D(1), 1, φ) and Ŷ (D(0), 0, φ)
collected from our peer encouragement design is an unbiased estimate of DITT (1, 0, φ).
Also, to estimate the peer ITT effect between the two mechanisms φ and ψ (i.e. PITT (1, φ, ψ)),
equation (6) states that the contrast between the sample averages Ŷ (D(1), 1, φ) and Ŷ (D(1), 1, ψ)
collected from our design is an unbiased estimate of PITT (1, φ, ψ). Note that other effects
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such as total and overall ITT effects can also be identified by directly applying the results
from Hudgens and Halloran (2008).
3.2 Network Exclusion Restriction
To identify and estimate actual treatment effects in networks, we need to make the fol-
lowing identifying assumptions common in the literature on encouragement designs and
instrumental variables. The first assumption, which we call network exclusion restriction,
is an extension of the exclusion restriction in Angrist et al. (1996) for network settings. It
was also stated as Assumption 1 in Sobel (2006).
Assumption 1 (Network Exclusion Restriction). For each block i and for any di, we have
Yij(di, zi) = Yij(di, z
′
i) ≡ Yij(di), ∀zi, z
′
i ∈ Zni
Assumption 1 states that the outcome of individual j in block i does not depend on his
encouragement assignment zij or his peers’ encouragement assignment zi(j) so long as the
treatment dij as well as the treatment of others in the block di(j) are fixed. In short, the
individual’s outcome Yij only depends on his and his peer’s treatment, di. Note that with-
out interference, Assumption 1 reduces to the usual exclusion restriction in Angrist et al.
(1996).
The exclusion restriction assumption is arguably the most problematic assumption in
encouragement designs or, more broadly, in instrumental variables literature, because it is
unverifiable with data and often requires subject-matter expertise to rule out various causal
pathways. In a similar vein, the peer encouragement design carries the same limitation.
However, recent work in online network experiments allow one to design encouragements
that, by design, satisfy the exclusion restriction (Eckles et al., 2016). In particular, fol-
lowing Eckles et al. (2016) who studied Facebook user behaviors, if the encouragement is
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a prod for a user to interact online in a specific way, say by writing comments, likes, or
providing positive/negative on a Facebook post, the treatment is the number of comments
or positive/negative feedback actually written on Facebook by the user, and the outcome
is some measure of user behavior, then the treatment value of others (i.e. other users’
actual comments or likes on Facebook) will only be visible if these users acted upon their
encouragements (i.e. the prod to write a comment). Hence, the outcome of a particular
user Yij will only be a function of his encouragement, zij , his treatment value dij, and his
peers’ treatment vector di(j). More importantly, the user’s outcome Yij will not depend on
his peers’ encouragements zi(j) and consequently, the network exclusion restriction will be
as plausible as the usual exclusion restriction in non-network settings under this particular
encouragement since we only have to worry about the individual’s encouragement zij and
its role in the potential outcome Yij(zi,di). Finally, there is some recent work relaxing the
exclusion restriction in non-network settings (Kang et al., 2016) using multiple encourage-
ments and it would be interesting topic of future research to see whether these ideas can
be applied to network settings.
3.3 Monotonicity
Similar to the traditional IV literature, Assumption 1 is not sufficient to point-identify the
average treatment effect (Imbens and Angrist, 1994; Herna´n and Robins, 2006; Baiocchi et al.,
2014). As such, following Angrist et al. (1996), we make the monotonicity assumption
Assumption 2 (Monotonicity). We assume that Dij(1)−Dij(0) ≥ 0 for all i, j
As discussed in Section 2.3, under the personalized encouragement assumption, we
can characterize local effects in terms of four different groups that individuals fall under,
always-takers, compliers, never-takers, and defiers. The monotonicity assumption removes
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the defiers who systematically defy the encouragement that they were assigned to.
Another assumption that is commonly invoked in traditional encouragement designs
and is stronger than monotonicity is the notion of one-sided compliance.
Assumption 3 (One-Sided Compliance). We assume Dij(z) = 0 for all i, j and z ∈ {0, 1}.
One-sided compliance states that if the individual was not encouraged, there is no
way that the individual can take the treatment. This type of assumption is common
in program-evaluation literature and has also been used under network settings (Sobel,
2006). Also, one-sided compliance implies monotonicity holds and, with respect to principal
stratification, that always-takers are also not possible. As we will see in Section 4.3, in
network settings with non-compliance, monotonicity and one-sided compliance each lead
to identification of slightly different peer effects, which is a departure from traditional
encouragement designs where both monotonicity and one-sided compliance identifies the
same estimand, the complier average treatment effect (Angrist et al., 1996).
4 Identification of Local Average Network Effects
In the next three sections, we delve in the heart of the paper, which is the identification of
causal estimands in network experiments where non-compliance may be present. Specifi-
cally, utilizing the peer encouragement design, which can be used in practice to deal with
settings where perfect treatment compliance is infeasible or which can serve as a vehicle to
understand non-compliance in network experiments, we define local network causal effects
and identification of these effects. Section 4.1 discusses local averaging of potential out-
comes, similar to Section 2.2, but local to different compliance classes discussed in Sections
2.2 and 3.3. Section 4.2 defines local network causal effects, such as local direct effects
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(LDTs) and local peer effects (LPTs). Finally, Section 4.3 discusses identification of the
local network causal effects.
4.1 Local Average Potential Outcomes
We start the discussion of identification of local network causal estimands by defining the
average of potential outcomes of individual j in block i if he had treatment d and rest of
his peers in the block had “natural” treatment values Di(j)(zi(j))
Y ij(d,Di(j), φ) =
∑
zi(j)∈Zni−1
Yij(Dij = d,Di(j)(zi(j)))Pφ(Zi(j) = zi(j)) (7)
with a slight abuse of notation where we useDij = d to indicate the assignment of individual
j’s treatment to value d. Note that by the personalized encouragement assumption in
equation (3), the averaging in (7) is over the treatment Di(j) where
Di(j)(zi(j)) = (Di1(Zi1), . . . , Dij−1(Zij−1), Dij+1(Zij+1), . . . , Dini(Zini))
Consequently, the average potential outcome, Y ij(d,Di(j), φ) in equation (7), differs from
the average potential outcome, Y ij(Dij(z), z, φ), in equation (1) because, by the network ex-
clusion restriction in Assumption 1, Y ij(Dij(z), z, φ) = Y ij(Dij(z), φ) so that Y ij(Dij(z), φ)
is the average potential outcomes of individual j if he and his peers took on his “natural”
treatment value Di(Zi). In contrast, Y ij(d,Di(j), φ) is the average potential outcomes of
individual j if he took a particular treatment value d while his peers took on natural
treatment values Di(j)(Zi(j)). Finally, both averages differ from average over the actual
treatment value d, say Yij(dij ,di(j), φ) where φ is the measure on di(j). Note that without
interference, Y ij(d,Di(j), φ) becomes the usual potential outcome Yij(d) in encouragement
designs. The supplementary materials discusses additional, subtle differences in averaging,
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which is unique to interference settings and has been discussed in other contexts, most
notably by VanderWeele and Tchetgen Tchetgen (2011).
Given the definition of average outcome in equation (7), we can define the usual block
average potential outcome
Y i(d,Di(j), φ) =
∑ni
j=1 Y ij(d,Di(j), φ)
ni
(8)
and the population average potential outcome, i.e. Y (d,Di(j), φ) =
∑B
i=1 Y i(d,Di(j), φ)/B.
In addition, we can define local block average potential outcome where the localization is
specific to the four stratas discussed in Sections 2.3 and 3.3. For example, we can define
complier block average potential outcome as the average of potential outcomes in equation
(7) among those individuals who are compliers,
Y i(d,Di(j), φ, Co) =
∑ni
j=1 Y ij(d,Di(j), φ)I(Dij(1) = 1, Dij(0) = 0)∑ni
j=1 I(Dij(1) = 1, Dij(0) = 0)
(9)
We can also define the population complier average potential outcome as Y (d,Di(j), φ, Co) =∑B
i=1 Y i(d,Di(j), φ, Co)/B. Without interference, equation (9) simplifies to the block com-
plier average potential outcome of individuals with treatment value d, i.e. Y i(d,Di(j), φ, Co) =∑ni
j=1 Yij(d)I(Dij(1) = 1, Dij(0) = 0)/
∑ni
j=1 I(Dij(1) = 1, Dij(0) = 0). From this perspec-
tive, equation (9) can be seen as a generalization of complier average potential outcomes
when interference is present. Finally, we note that we can equivalently define a similar
quantity like (9) for always-takers, never-takers, and defiers.
4.2 Local Network Effects
Once we defined the local average potential outcomes in (9), we can define local network
effects such as local direct treatment effects, denoted as LDT s, and local peer treatment
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effects, denoted as LPT s. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first definition of a
local effect in network randomized experiments. Consider any two values of the treatment
d′, d ∈ {0, 1} where d′ 6= d and the two mechanisms φ and ψ where φ 6= ψ. Then, we define
the complier direct treatment effects and complier peer treatment effects as follows.
LDTi(d
′, d, φ, Co) = Y i(d
′, Di(j), φ, Co)− Y i(d,Di(j), φ, Co)
LDT (d′, d, φ, Co) =
1
B
B∑
i=1
LDTi(d
′, Di(j), φ, Co) = Y (d
′, Di(j), φ, Co)− Y (d,Di(j), φ, Co)
LPTi(d, φ, ψ, Co) = Y i(d,Di(j), φ, Co)− Y i(d,Di(j), ψ, Co)
LPT (d, φ, ψ, Co) =
1
B
B∑
i=1
LPTi(d, φ, ψ, Co) = Y (d,Di(j), φ, Co)− Y (d,Di(j), ψ, Co)
The quantity LDT (1, 0, φ, Co) is the population average direct causal effect among com-
pliers who take treatment d = 1 over d = 0 while their peers take on natural treatment
values Di(j)(zi(j)). The quantity LPT (1, φ, ψ, Co) is the population average peer causal ef-
fect among compliers who take treatment d = 1 while their peers take on natural treatment
values Di(j). If a treatment is supposed to confer benefits in the form of a high outcome
value, a high value of LDT (1, 0, φ, Co) would indicate that the treatment has a strong
direct effect among individuals who comply with the encouragement. Also, a high value of
LPT (1, φ, ψ, Co) would indicate that the peer’s treatments have strong influences for the
outcomes of compliers. Again, similar to equation (9), we can also define LDT s and LPT s
for always-takers, never-takers, and defiers.
The local effects like LDT s and LPT s differ from intent-to-treat effects like DITT s and
PITT s and other network estimands that have been defined in the literature. In particular,
LDT s and LPT s describe the efficacy of an individual’s treatment whileDITT s and PITT s
describe the efficacy of the encouragement. Also, LDT s and LPT s differ from the direct
effects and indirect/spillover effects of Hudgens and Halloran (2008) in that LDT s and
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LPT s only average over the potential outcomes over subpopulations of individuals, say
compliers, and over the peers’ natural treatment values. The LDT s and LPT s will equal
the direct and spillover effects of Hudgens and Halloran (2008) if we average across all
the individuals and if Dij(zij) = zij for every zij and i, j, i.e. if everyone is a complier;
otherwise, some potential outcomes may not be observed and consequently, these potential
outcomes may not part of the local average outcome in equation (7). Ideally, it would be
attractive to estimate the direct treatment effects and indirect/spillover treatment effects
of Hudgens and Halloran (2008). However, if randomization of the treatment is infeasible,
or treatment compliance cannot be fully enforced, it would be difficult, if not impossible,
to identify those effects and we are left with what other quantity can one identify, in our
case LDT s and LPT s. These LDT s and LPTS may be the second best estimates to the
direct and spillover treatment effects, much like how the local average treatment effect
(LATE) in non-network settings (Imbens and Angrist, 1994; Angrist et al., 1996) is the
second best estimate to the average treatment effect (ATE) whenever non-compliance is
present(Imbens, 2010, 2014; Baiocchi et al., 2014).
We also define the peer treatment effect for everyone based on the average potential
outcome in equation (8). This estimand will be useful when we describe identification
under one-sided compliance in Section 4.3.
LPTi(d, φ, ψ) = Y i(d,Di(j), φ)− Y i(d,Di(j), ψ)
LPT (d, φ, ψ) =
1
B
B∑
i=1
LPTi(d, φ, ψ) = Y (d,Di(j), φ)− Y (d,Di(j), ψ)
The difference between LPTi(d, φ, ψ) and LPTi(d, φ, ψ, Co) is that the average poten-
tial outcome in LPTi(d, φ, ψ) is across everyone in the block while LPTi(d, φ, ψ, Co) is
only for compliers. Furthermore, the quantity LPTi(d, φ, ψ) describes the causal effect
of an identifiable group of people in the population, which is everyone, while the quan-
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tity LPTi(d, φ, ψ, Co) describes the causal effect of an unidentifiable group of the pop-
ulation, the population of compliers. Hence, LPTi(d, φ, ψ) avoids some of the concerns
over local causal estimands about identifying an unidentifiable subset of the population
(Herna´n and Robins, 2006; Deaton, 2010; Swanson and Herna´n, 2014).
4.3 Identification of LDT s and LPT s
Given the peer encouragement design and the assumptions regarding exclusion restriction
and monotonicity, we can start to make progress on identifying local network effects, such as
LDT s and LPTs. To begin, we first define the average causal effect of the encouragement
on the treatment, denoted as ET s,
ETi(z
′, z) =
1
ni
ni∑
j=1
Dij(z
′)−Dij(z)
ET (z′, z) =
1
B
B∑
i=1
ETi(z
′, z) =
1
B
B∑
i=1
1
ni
∑
j=ni
Dij(z
′)−Dij(z)
ETi(z
′, z) is the block i’s average causal effect of the encouragement on the treatment while
ET (z′, z) is the population average causal effect of the encouragement on the treatment.
Both quantities can be identified and estimated by taking sample averages of the treatment
under different values of the encouragement, i.e.
ETi(z
′, z) = E
(∑ni
j=1DijI(Zij = z
′)∑ni
j=1 I(Zij = z
′)
−
∑ni
j=1DijI(Zij = z)∑ni
j=1 I(Zij = z)
)
Note that because of the personalized encouragement assumption in equation (3), the ET s
do not depend on a measure, say φ or ψ.
With the intent-to-treat effects defined in Section 3.1, we can identify the local treatment
effects defined in Section4.2. First, Theorem 1 shows that the ratio of DITT over ET
identifies the local direct treatment effect among compliers.
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Theorem 1 (Identification of Complier LDT ). Suppose we use the peer encouragement
design and Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then, for any measure φ
DITT (1, 0, φ)
ET (1, 0)
= LDT (1, 0, φ, Co) (10)
Theorem 1 is a generalization of the classic result about ratio estimators in instrumental
variables, i.e. the Wald estimator. It states that under interference, the ratio of the
intent-to-treat effects identifies the local direct treatment effect among compliers; without
interference, Theorem 1 reduces to Proposition 1 in Angrist et al. (1996) where the ratio
of the intent-to-treat effects identifies the local treatment effect among compliers. The
interference forces us to consider the individual average potential outcomes as defined in
Section 4.1 and pool their individual effects according to some measure φ. Note that we can
equivalently identify LDT (1, 0, ψ, Co) under a different measure ψ by using DITT (1, 0, ψ)
instead ofDITT (1, 0, φ) in (10). Finally, we note that in Sobel (2006), the author identified
a different and arguably more complex estimand, using the Wald estimator, primarily
because personalized encouragement assumption was absent in his work and therefore, his
causal estimand was much more difficult to interpret.
Second, Theorem 2 shows that the ratio of difference in PITT s over ET identifies the
difference in local peer treatment effect among compliers.
Theorem 2 (Identification of Difference in Complier LPT ). Suppose we use the peer
encouragement design and Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then,
PITT (1, ψ, φ)− PITT (0, ψ, φ)
ET (1, 0)
= LPT (1, ψ, φ, Co)− LPT (0, ψ, φ, Co) (11)
Unlike Theorem 1, which is a natural generalization of the results in Angrist et al.
(1996), the result in Theorem 2 is specific to the case when interference is present. Specif-
ically, interference presents a new set of estimand, the peer effect, and Theorem 2 shows
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that the difference of local peer treatment effects can be identified by using the differ-
ence of intent-to-treatment effects, scaled by ET (1, 0). While initially, the difference be-
tween LPT s may not be useful, in most practical applications, it will not be the case that
LPT (1, ψ, φ, Co) and LPT (0, ψ, φ, Co) would be identically in magnitude and opposite in
sign. Consequently, if the ratio of PITT (1, ψ, φ)−PITT (0, ψ, φ) over ET (1, 0) is not zero,
there is reason to believe that there is some peer effect of the treatment in the presence of
non-compliance. Furthermore, the sign of the local peer effect can indicate a difference in
magnitude between the peer effect when one is treated, LPT (1, ψ, φ, Co), and when one
isn’t treated, LPT (0, ψ, φ, Co).
The main reason that we cannot identify each component of the LPT s under the peer
encouragement design with network exclusion restriction and monotonicity is because peer
treatment effects require the individual treatment value to be held fixed. This would imply
that the encouragement should have no effect on the treatment, defeating the original
purpose of the encouragement which attempts to provide a random nudge for individuals to
take treatment. In addition, the peer effect among compliers would not be identifiable since
compliers are those that change treatment assignment according to their encouragement
assignment. Indeed, there is some sense that monotonicity is not strong enough to tease
out specific peer effects.
In light of these discussions about the identifiability of LPT s, we show in Theorem 3
that under a more strict version of monotonicity where we assume one-sided compliance,
we can identify the local peer treatment effect LPT (d, φ, ψ).
Theorem 3. Suppose we use the peer encouragement design and Assumptions 1 and 3
hold. Then, we have
PITT (0, φ, ψ) = LPT (0, φ, ψ) (12)
Theorem 3 states that under one-sided compliance, the peer intent-to-treat effect is
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equal to the local peer treatment effect for everyone. This is because those who are assigned
an encouragement value of Zij = 0 can never receive the treatment and thus, the treatment
value is fixed at Dij = 0. This allows us to identify the peer treatment effect, which
requires the treatment value to be fixed. We remark that if the one-sided compliance is
designed such that Dij(1) = 1, then by using the same argument as Theorem 3, we obtain
PITT (1, φ, ψ) = LPT (1, φ, ψ). Also, as mentioned before, unlike the usual encouragement
design, assuming monotonicity or one-sided compliance leads to different identification.
The identification results from Theorems 1 to 3 highlight many ways one can obtain
some evidence of direct or peer treatment effects from ITT effects. While the peer encour-
agement design is not a perfect solution in practice in the sense that we can not recover the
original direct or peer treatment effect and instead, we have to settle with local versions of
said effects, the results provide familiar and interpretive estimands of the treatment effect
in settings where the treatment cannot be randomly assigned. From the perspective of
non-compliance, the analysis of the peer encouragement design shows that non-compliance
in network settings can introduce new complexities, such as the identification of local dif-
ference in peer effects and different identifications under different versions of monotonicity,
while also generalizing familiar estimand in the IV literature, such as the generalization of
the complier average treatment effect to the direct complier average treatment effect.
We briefly remark on estimation and inference of the LDT s and LPT s. For point-
estimation, a simple strategy for obtaining estimates of LDT s and LPTs is to use the plug-
in approach where we replace population estimands of the intent-to-treat estimands in equa-
tions (10)-(12) with the sample versions outlined in Section 3.1. Unfortunately, for inference
like confidence intervals, interference makes this problem difficult and one may have to (i)
make stratified interference assumption (Hudgens and Halloran, 2008) about the intent-to-
treat effects, (ii) use bounds if the outcome is binary (Tchetgen Tchetgen and VanderWeele,
2012), or (iii) resort to asymptotic approximations (Liu and Hudgens, 2014) to make progress.
However, once these simplifying assumptions are made, one can use the delta method to ob-
tain a first-order approximation of confidence intervals and standard errors; see Chapter 23
of Imbens and Rubin (2015) on using the delta method for instrumental variables with ITT
estimates. Overall, the key to obtaining inference for the local causal network estimands
rely on obtaining accurate inference for the ITT effects in the presence of interference and
we leave it as a topic of future research.
5 Discussion
In this paper, we present an experimental design, the peer encouragement design, to study
network effects when randomizing the treatment is infeasible and treatment compliance
cannot be enforced. The new design is motivated by approaches in causal inference with
partial interference as well as encouragement designs popular in instrumental variables
analysis. However, the new design deviates from the prior literature by introducing the
notion of personalized encouragement and local estimands in network settings, both of
which work to reduce the exponential heterogeneity that is present in network settings
with non-compliance. The peer encouragement design serves not only for future empirical
work to study treatment efficacy whenever treatment randomization is infeasible, but also
to study the effect of non-compliance when randomized experiments are conducted on
networks.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
Supplementary Materials for Peer Encouragement Design Supplementary materi-
als contain additional details of the experimental design. (.pdf file)
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6 Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1. By the exclusion restriction and personalized encouragement, we have
Y ij(Dij(1), 1, φ)− Y ij(Dij(0), 0, φ)
=Y ij(Dij(1), φ)− Y ij(Dij(0), φ)
=
∑
zi(j)∈Zni−1
(
Yij(Dij(1) = 1,Di(j)(zi(j)))Dij(1) + Yij(Dij(1) = 0,Di(j)(zi(j)))(1−Dij(1))
)
Pφ(Zi(j) = zi(j))
−
(
Yij(Dij(0) = 1,Di(j)(zi(j)))Dij(0) + Yij(Dij(0) = 0,Di(j)(zi(j)))(1−Dij(0))
)
Pφ(Zi(j) = zi(j))
=(Dij(1)−Dij(0))
∑
zi(j)∈Zni−1
(
Yij(Dij(1) = 1,Di(j)(zi(j)))− Yij(Dij(0) = 0,Di(j)(zi(j)))
)
Pφ(Zi(j) = zi(j))
=(Dij(1)−Dij(0))(Y ij(1, Di(j), φ)− Y ij(1, Di(j), φ))
Then, under monotonicity, we can take the blockwise average to obtain
DITTi(1, 0, φ)
=
1
ni
ni∑
j=1
Y ij(Dij(1), 1, φ)− Y ij(Dij(0), 0, φ)
=
1
ni
ni∑
j=1
(Dij(1)−Dij(0))(Y ij(1, Di(j), φ)− Y ij(0, Di(j), φ))
=
(∑ni
j=1 I(Dij(1) = 1, Dij(0) = 0)
ni
) ∑
j:Dij(1)=1,Dij (0)=0
Y ij(1, Di(j), φ)− Y ij(0, Di(j), φ))
=
(∑ni
j=1 I(Dij(1) = 1, Dij(0) = 0)
ni
)
LDTi(1, 0, φ, Co)
Diving the above quantity by ETi(1, 0) and summing across the blocks will give you iden-
tification of LDT (1, 0, φ, Co).
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Proof of Theorem 2. By the exclusion restriction and personalized encouragement, we have
Y ij(Dij(1), 1, φ)− Y ij(Dij(1), 1, ψ)
=Y ij(Dij(1), φ)− Y ij(Dij(1), ψ)
=
∑
zi(j)∈Zni−1
(
Yij(Dij(1) = 1, Di(j)(zi(j)))Dij(1) + Yij(Dij(1) = 0, Di(j)(zi(j)))(1−Dij(1))
)
Pφ(Zi(j) = zi(j))
−
(
Yij(Dij(1) = 1, Di(j)(zi(j)))Dij(1) + Yij(Dij(0) = 0, Di(j)(zi(j)))(1−Dij(1))
)
Pψ(Zi(j) = zi(j))
=Dij(1)(Y ij(1, Di(j), φ)− Y ij(1, Di(j), ψ)) + (1−Dij(1))(Y ij(0, Di(j), φ)− Y ij(0, Di(j), ψ))
A similar algebraic manipulation also leads to
Y ij(Dij(0), 0, φ)− Y ij(Dij(0), 0, ψ)
=Dij(0)(Y ij(1, Di(j), φ)− Y ij(1, Di(j), ψ)) + (1−Dij(0))(Y ij(0, Di(j), φ)− Y ij(0, Di(j), ψ))
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Then, under monotonicity, we can take the block average to obtain
PITTi(1, φ, ψ)− PITTi(0, φ, ψ)
=
1
ni
ni∑
j=1
Y ij(Dij(1), φ)− Y ij(Dij(1), ψ)−
1
ni
ni∑
j=1
Y ij(Dij(0), φ)− Y ij(Dij(0), ψ)
=
1
ni
ni∑
j=1
Dij(1)(Y ij(1, Di(j), φ)− Y ij(1, Di(j), ψ)) + (1−Dij(1))(Y ij(0, Di(j), φ)− Y ij(0, Di(j), ψ))
−
1
ni
ni∑
j=1
Dij(0)(Y ij(1, Di(j), φ)− Y ij(1, Di(j), ψ)) + (1−Dij(0))(Y ij(0, Di(j), φ)− Y ij(0, Di(j), ψ))
=
1
ni
ni∑
j=1
(Dij(1)−Dij(0))(Y ij(1, Di(j), φ)− Y ij(1, Di(j), ψ))
−
1
ni
ni∑
j=1
(Dij(1)−Dij(0))(Y ij(0, Di(j), φ)− Y ij(0, Di(j), ψ))
=
(∑ni
j=1 I(Dij(1) = 1, Dij(0) = 0)
ni
)
LPTi(1, φ, ψ, Co)
−
(∑ni
j=1 I(Dij(1) = 1, Dij(0) = 0)
ni
)
LPTi(0, φ, ψ, Co)
Diving the above quantity by ETi(1, 0) and summing across the blocks will give you the
identification of LPT (1, φ, ψ, Co)− LPT (0, φ, ψ, Co).
Proof of Theorem 3. From the proof from Theorem 2, we have
Y ij(Dij(0), 0, φ)− Y ij(Dij(0), 0, ψ)
=Dij(0)(Y ij(1, Di(j), φ)− Y ij(1, Di(j), ψ)) + (1−Dij(0))(Y ij(0, Di(j), φ)− Y ij(0, Di(j), ψ))
By one-sided compliance, we have
Y ij(Dij(0), 0, φ)− Y ij(Dij(0), 0, ψ) = (Y ij(0, Di(j), φ)− Y ij(0, Di(j), ψ))
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Then, taking the block average gives us
PITTi(0, φ, ψ) =
1
ni
ni∑
j=1
(Y ij(0, Di(j), φ)− Y ij(0, Di(j), ψ)) =
1
ni
LPT (0, φ, ψ)
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